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THE WASHINGTON SHORELINE
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1971
Geoffrey Crooks*
As an awareness of ecological values and environmental concerns
becomes increasingly shared by all citizens, much attention has been
focused on uses and abuses of the coastal zone. The public's stake in
preserving those economic and aesthetic resources created by the in-
terface of land and water has been well documented and eloquently
stated, and need not be restated here.1 With approval of the Shoreline
Management Act of 19712 (SMA), Washington has joined the in-
creasing ranks of states which are attempting to influence legislatively
the course of development of their coastal resources.3 The Wash-
ington Act, unusually broad in scope, concerns not merely "coastal"
areas but also shorelines of bodies of water of virtually every descrip-
tion, including lakes and streams so small or so obscure as to be
nameless.4 This article, after briefly describing the circumstances of
the SMA's enactment and the prior law, examines and evaluates (to
the extent possible based on two years of operation) the resource
management program established by the Act.
I. CIRCUMSTANCES OF ENACTMENT
Bills affecting various segments of the state's shorelines were intro-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B., Haverford College,
1965; J.D., University of Chicago, 1968. Support in aid of the research underlying this
article came from the Office of Sea Grant Programs, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, Department of Commerce, administered by the Division of Marine
Resources, University of Washington.
I. Probably the single most complete discussion of the coastal zone is THE WATER'S
EDGE: CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE COASTAL ZONE (B. Ketchum, ed. 1972). See also COMM'N
ON MARINE SCIENCE. ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES. OUR NATION AND THE SEA (1969)
(popularly known as the Stratton Report).
2. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.58.010-.930 (Supp. 1972).
3. See E. BRADLEY & J. ARMSTRONG, A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF COASTAL ZONE
AND SHORELAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1972). The National
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. II, 1973) is designed
to encourage and assist states in developing coastal management programs.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(c)-(e), discussed in text accompanying notes 50-
56 infra. The State Department of Ecology's catalogue of rivers and streams covered by
the Act is set forth in WASH. AD. CODE § 173-18 (1972). Lakes are similarly catalogued




duced in several legislative sessions prior to 1971. 5 None passed.
Fearing continued legislative inaction, the Washington Environmental
Council, a citizens' organization, drafted a Shoreline Protection Act
and obtained enough signatures on petitions to submit it as Initiative
Measure 43 to the 1971 Legislature.6
The Legislature took no action on Initiative 43 but enacted the
SMA, also styled as Alternative Measure 43B, as a substitute. 7 The
two major differences between the SMA and the initiative were that
the former covered land 200 feet landward of the shoreline and
placed primary planning and administrative responsibility on local
governments, while the latter extended coverage to 500 feet and cen-
tralized responsibility in the state Department of Ecology.8
At the November 1972 general election, the two measures were
submitted to the people. The ballot procedure allowed the electorate
first to vote for or against either system of statutory shoreline regula-
tion, and then to express a preference between them.9 Either of the two
measures was preferred, as against no shoreline legislation, by
5. These included a "Scenic Rivers Act" in 1967, a wetlands bill in 1969, and several
seacoast management bills in 1970. The progressive intensifying of interest is described,
often with personal commentary on the political atmosphere, by two who were close to
the process (James M. Dolliver, Administrative Assistant to the Governor, and Dorothy
Morrell, Chairman, Salt Water Shorelines Committee, Washington Environmental Coun-
cil) in papers delivered at a symposium held in Seattle Center on June 24, 1972. These
papers are collected in Shorelines Management: The Washington Experience, June 24.
1972 [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
6. See Dolliver & Morrell, Symposium, supra note 5.
7. An initiative to the Legislature, such as Initiative 43, presents the Legislature with
four choices. The legislature: (I) May simply enact the initiative as presented: (2) may
enact it subject to approval by the voters; (3) may reject or take no action on it, in which
case it still must be referred to the electorate for possible adoption or (4) may enact sub-
stitute legislation on the same subject (essentially rejecting the initiative), in which case
both the substitute and the initiative must be referred to the people. In this last situation.
the voters first vote on whether they desire either of the two choices offered rather than
neither, then cast a second vote designating which choice they prefer (or find less onerous.
if they oppose both). WASH. CONST. art. I1, § I(a) (amend. 7).
8. Due, no doubt, to the circumstances of presentation to the voters (see text accom-
panying note 9 infra), a number of pamphlets and broadsides were produced comparing
the acts. See, e.g., J. Barron. Shoreline Management-What Are the Choices? Decem-
ber. 1971. Another comparison, not produced for voter consumption, is included in
BRADLEY & ARMSTRONG. supra note 3, at 267-298. The complete text of the initiative is
contained in SECRETARY OF STATE. OFFICIAL VOTER'S PAMPHLET 88-93 (1972).
9. See note 7 supra. Apparently this legislative alternative procedure had never been
used prior to the November, 1972, election. W. Spencer, Environmental Management for
Puget Sound: Certain Problems of Political Organization and Alternative Approaches 33,
November, 197 1. That election presented not only the shoreline acts but also less contro-
versial litter control legislation in that form. OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET. supra note 8, at
28-35.
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603,167 to 551,132, and Alternative Measure 43B (the SMA) was
preferred to Initiative 43 by 611,748 to 285,721.10
In enacting the SMA, the legislature provided that it would be in
force during the interim between its enactment and its subsequent
approval or rejection by the voters." The SMA thus became effective
on June 1, 1971.12
II. THE LAW PRIOR TO ENACTMENT
OF THE SMA
Although the Environmental Council deserves much credit for pro-
voking legislative action on shoreline planning, the ultimate responsi-
bility for passage of the SMA belongs to the Washington Supreme
Court. On December 4, 1969, the court handed down its decision in
the celebrated Lake Chelan case,13 a decision whose poten-
tial ramifications produced muffled curses from the developers and
chortles of glee from the environmentalists. 14 Both groups suddenly
became aware of the desirability of shoreline legislation: the former to
cut their losses and define their legal positions and the latter to solidify
what was seen as a far-reaching and unexpected victory. Though
sharp controversy developed over the full import of the decision, 15 the
simple creation of uncertainty was probably as important as the sub-
stance of the decision in promoting the enactment of the Shoreline
legislation.
The level of Lake Chelan is artificially fluctuated. Defendants
owned land that was submerged when the lake level was high. They
10. Final tally obtained by the University of Washington Law Library reference desk
from the Secretary of State, August 20, 1973.
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.930. See note 177 infra.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.920.
13. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Lake Chelan, the case's common name].
14. These responses, suitably muted for the medium of scholarly legal commentary,
are exemplified by the exchange between Professor Corker (Corker, Thou Shalt Not Fill
Public Waters Without Public Permission- Washington'sLake Chelan Decision, 45 WASH.
L. REV. 65 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Corker]) and Edward A. Rauscher (Rauscher,
The Lake Chelan Case--Another Viewi 45 WASH. L. REV. 523 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Rauscher]). Professor Corker's disclaimer of the environmentalist label (see Corker at
83 n.45) may be sincere, but for our purposes may be declared void. Mr. Rauscher re-
sponded explicitly "in the spirit of an advocate" for developers.
15. Corker and Rauscher, supra note 14.
425
Washington Law Review
had filled that land to a grade permanently above the highest water
level in order to use it as a trailer court. The Washington court or-
dered abatement of the fill, on the ground that it "obstructed the rights
of plaintiffs and the public to swim, boat, fish, bathe, recreate and
navigate in the waters of the lake."' 6 Professor Corker's statement of
the holding' 7-"ownership of lands beneath navigable waters does not
give the owner a right to restrict use of those waters for all the public
purposes to which they are suited"-provides an easy avenue into
examination of the controversy surrounding the decision.
Over the years the state has sold much shoreland and tideland' 8
which, in its natural state, was navigable part-time, at high water, for
some or all of the uses catalogued above. l ' Some of that privately
owned land has been filled in dramatic fashion.20 More, undoubtedly,
is (or was at the time of Lake Chelan) the subject of development
plans which would require fills. In assessing the decision's impact, Pro-
fessor Corker recognized the potentially important distinction between
the privately owned property in Lake Chelan which had neither been
naturally submerged nor ever owned by the state, and tidelands and
shorelands which have been sold by the state to private owners,2 '
often with an intent to encourage economically productive develop-
ment. As to the latter, although he saw "not inconsiderable"' 2 equities
in favor of prior fills, he cautioned against fills subsequent to the Lake
Chelan decision: "public waters, and lands underlying them, which
have not been filled cannot be the subject of constitutionally vested
property rights in the same sense as may lands which are wholly above
water."23
16. Corker. .upra note 14. at 65.
17. Id. at 68.
18. First and second class tidelands and shorelands are defined in WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 79.01.020-.032(1963).
19. Mr. Rauscher argues that the waters periodically overlying tide and shorelands
are not necessarily "navigable," even though the primary adjacent body of water is.
Rauscher. supra note 14, at 530. Professor Corker would prefer to abandon the "navig-
ability" concept as without consistent or reliable meaning. either in the abstract or
the particular, and praises Lake Chelan for progress in that direction. See Corker.
su/pra note 14, at 65 n.2& 76-81.
20. Mr. Rauscher cites, as examples of filled tideland, Seattle's Harbor Island and
portions of downtown Seattle as far "upland" as Second Avenue. Rauscher. supra
note 14, at 531.
21. Corker, supra note 14. at 7 1-76.
22. Id. at 73.
23. Id. at 75.
426
Vol. 49: 423, 1974
The Shoreline Management Act
Mr. Rauscher, writing in rejoinder, emphatically disagreed: "The
Washington Supreme Court has clearly not deemed the rights derived
from private ownership of tide or shorelands to be of the rather flimsy
nature suggested by Professor Corker. 24 Rather, he argued that in
many cases the grant by the state was of an absolute fee simple title
which carried with it, among other rights, the right to fill.
It is unnecessary to advance a personal opinion as to which com-
mentator had the best of this argument at the time.25 The court did
not have the opportunity to resolve the question prior to the enact-
ment of the SMA, by which time its significance had diminished.26
There is little doubt, however, that despite Mr. Rauscher's arguments
tide and shoreland property owners recognized the decision as a
threatening cloud over plans for development.27
If the breadth of applicability of Lake Chelan was unclear, its ef-
fect when applicable was not. The owner of land underlying navigable
waters with a fluctuating level could not use that land by filling it, al-
though the court suggested no limitation on his right to make any use
he wished during times when the water level was low and the land not
submerged.2 8
Different rules pertained to privately owned land underlying
non-navigable bodies of water. In Bach v. Sarich,2 9 the court ordered
abatement of an apartment building which extended over the surface
of non-navigable 19 acre Bitter Lake in Seattle. Both plaintiffs and
defendants were riparian owners, defendants owning that portion of
the lake bed onto which their building extended. In the court's view,
the defendants could not interfere with the plaintiffs' right to use the
entire lake surface, unless defendants' use of their portion of the lake
bed was reasonable. Under no circumstances, however, could a
non-riparian use like the apartment building in question be found rea-
24. Rauscher, supra note 14, at 527.
25. It might also be unwise to take sides. Agreeing with Corker might suggest
academic conspiracy. Agreeing with Rauscher might lead a colleague to bark at me
over lunch.
26. But see discussion accompanying notes 198-204 infra.
27. See Gorton, Symposium, supra note 5, at 3.
28. 77 Wn. 2d at 315, 317 n.13, 462 P.2d at 238, 239 n.13. The court also sug-
gested, in the cited footnote, that government might authorize otherwise illegal fills.
See text accompanying notes 198-99 infra.
29. 74 Wn. 2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
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sonable. Presumably, uses such as docks or piers would be riparian
and would be permissible if reasonable. 30
Thus, property sometimes underlying navigable waters was in one
sense subject to greater restriction than was property underlying
non-navigable waters. The former could not be developed in a fashion
which would interfere with use of the water's surface, while the latter
could be, as long as the development was reasonable and riparian. As
will be noted in assessing the impact of the SMA, however, it seemed
that the legislative power to authorize otherwise inappropriate uses in
navigable waters was greater than for non-navigable waters.3 1 It
should also be noted that for navigable waters inappropriate uses
would interfere with public rights of navigation, and might be chal-
lenged by any member of the public; 32 inappropriate uses of
non-navigable waters, on the other hand, could only be challenged by
other riparians.
Even prior to the SMA, then, state law imposed significant restric-
tions on the use of land which was submerged full or part-time. 33 But
the Act, as we shall see, applies to substantial dry land areas as well.
While prior to the Act those areas might have been subject to restric-
tions imposed or authorized by general state law (for example, the
same zoning or nuisance laws potentially applicable to any property in
the state), with one minor exception no restrictions were imposed
solely because of the land's proximity to a shoreline. The single excep-
tion was that privately owned dry sand beach areas abutting the sea-
coast are possibly subject to the right of the public to use the beach.
The Oregon Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay,34 found
such a public right, arising from customary use, to prohibit defendant
resort owners from fencing off that portion of their land which was
dry sand beach. An opinion by the Attorney General of Washington
30. The case is discussed extensively in Johnson & Morry, Filling and Building on
Small Lakes--Time for Judicial and Legislative Controls, 45 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1970)
[hereinafter cited asJohnson & Morry].
31. Id. at 57-58. Lake Chelan, 77 Wn. 2d at 317-18 n. 13.462 P.2d at 239.
32. Corker. supra note 14, at 80.
33. State law is not the only consideration. For example, federal law may pose
hurdles to developments in "navigable waters of the United States." These problems,
however, are beyond the scope of this article.
34. 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
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concludes that the doctrine of custom would support the same result
in this state.35
III. THE REGULATORY DESIGN
OF THE SMA
The SMA begins with an extensive statement of legislative findings
and policy. It then creates a regulatory scheme which requires an in-
ventory of the state's shorelines and subsequent development of
"master programs" which designate the types of uses permissible for
individual segments of those shorelines. To enforce this regulatory
scheme the Act establishes a permit system which requires prior ap-
proval for many types of shoreline uses. For each major aspect of this
regulatory program, administrative responsibility rests primarily with
local governments, reviewed and supported by the state Department
of Ecology (the Department).36
A. Legislative Findings and Policy
Section 2 of the Act 37 states that Washington's shorelines are a vital
resource and announces a policy of coordinated, environmentally
aware planning. However, since the act was a compromise designed to
attract broad support-and win voter approval at the polls3 8-
shining phrases can be mined from the statement of policy to support
most positions which an attorney, environmentalist or developer may
desire to promote.
Initially, "[t] he legislature finds that the shorelines of the state are
among the most valuable and fragile of its natural resources and that
there is great concern throughout the state relating to their utilization,
protection, restoration, and preservation." 39 Unrestricted and uncoor-
dinated construction on the shorelines is not in the public interest, al-
though private property rights must be recognized and protected.
"There is, therefore, a clear and urgent demand for a planned, ra-
35. OP. WASH. ATT'y GEN. No. 27 (1970).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020.
38. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020.
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tional, and concerted effort . . .to prevent the inherent harm in an
uncoordinated and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines." 40
At first, the policy statements seem as straightforward as the find-
ings. Easily digestible are the notions of providing "for the manage-
ment of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all
reasonable and appropriate uses" and "protecting against adverse
effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wild life,
and the waters of the state and their aquatic life .... -41 Complexity
arrives with a listing in preferential order4 2 of general criteria for de-
termining uses to be made of those shorelines which the Act designates
"shorelines of state-wide significance. '43 These criteria, it has been
suggested, 44 tend to favor the environment over the economy, a tend-
ency which seems to carry into the final two paragraphs of Section 2.
Those final paragraphs again state policies for the "shorelines of the
state," a classification broader than and inclusive of "shorelines of
state-wide significance. '45 Mentioned explicitly are "the public's op-
portunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic quality of natural shore-
lines" and "control of pollution and prevention of damage to the nat-
ural environment.....
Furthermore:
Alterations of the natural condition of the shorelines of the state, in
those limited instances when authorized, shall be given priority for
single family residences, ports, shoreline recreational uses including
but not limited to parks, marinas, piers, and other improvements facil-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Uses are to be preferred which (in the following order of preference):
(1) Recognize and protect the state-wide interest over local interest:
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
13) Result in long term over short term benefit:
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline:
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the shorelines:
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the shoreline;(7) Provide for any other element as defined in RCW 90.58.100 deemed appro-
priate or necessary.
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020. This list in itself may be too general and vague to be of
much value in planning. However, the Department's final guidelines for development
of master programs discuss these criteria in detail and lend a degree of substance
to them. See WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040(5) (1972).
43. Defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(e). See notes 53-56 and accom-
panying text infra.
44. Graham, Symposium, stupra note 5. at 83-86.
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(c).
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itating public access to the shorelines of the state, industrial and com-
mercial developments which are particularly dependent on their loca-
tion on or use of the shorelines of the state ....
This is an enumeration of specific favored developments, not merely a
list of criteria as is provided for shorelines of state-wide significance.
No order of preference is suggested for these developments. However,
the character of the list emphasizes the Act's policy of devoting shore-
lines to water-related or water-dependent uses.46
The final admonition of Section 2 is again ecologically concerned:
"Permitted uses in the shorelines of the state shall be designed and
conducted in a manner to minimize, insofar as practical, any resultant
damage to the ecology and environment of the shoreline area and any
interference with the public's use of the water."
Section 37 requires that the act be liberally construed "to give full
effect to. . . [its] objectives and purposes. '47
B. Coverage
The first step required for planning is to determine which land and
water areas are subject to the Act. The Act thus directs local govern-
ments (counties and municipalities) 48 to complete, within 18 months
of the effective date of the act, inventories of "shorelines of the state"
within their jurisdictions.4.' "Shorelines of the state," the statutory
designation for the area covered by the Act, is composed of two sub-
categories: "shorelines," and "shorelines of state-wide significance." 50
46. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020. It would seem consonant with the purpose of
this section to allow even favored developments to encroach on the shorelines or the
water's surface only to the extent that such encroachment is necessary to a particular
development's function. For example, there is no necessity for a single family resi-
dence to extend over the water's surface. Port development, on the other hand, would
usually require some construction over water.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.900.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(1)(c). See note 111 infra.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.080(1). WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.070 directed local
governments to submit to the Department letters stating their intent to complete in-
ventories. The Department was directed to undertake inventories for those local
governments which failed to submit such a letter. Lewis and Skamania Counties
elected to allow the Department to compile their inventories, as did three or four
cities. Rogers, Symposium, sutpra note 5, at 104.
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2Xc).
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The Act defines "shorelines" as "all of the water areas of the state,
including reservoirs, and their associated wetlands, together with the
lands underlying them" with the exception of "shorelines of state-wide
significance," shorelines of stream segments above the point where the
mean annual flow is 20 cubic feet per second and shorelines of lakes
smaller than twenty acres. 51 Applying this definition presents few dif-
ficulties beyond the problem, discussed below, of defining "associated
wetlands."
"Shorelines of state-wide significance" is a category of shorelines
which were thought to be of sufficient importance to give the state,
through the Department more substantial planning authority than it
was given for ordinary "shorelines."52 This designation includes: 53 (1)
The ocean coastline of the state (including bays, etc.) seaward from
the ordinary high water mark (technically defined in the Act, but bas-
ically the line of vegetation);5 4 (2) specifically described portions of Puget
Sound and the Strait of Juan de Fuca, between the ordinary high
water mark and the line of extreme low tide; (3) all of Puget Sound
and the Strait below the line of extreme low tide; (4) lakes over 1,000
acres; (5) segments of rivers which, if west of the crest of the Cas-
cades, have a mean annual flow of at least 1,000 cubic feet per sec-
ond, or if east of the crest of the Cascades, have either a mean annual
flow of at least 200 cubic feet per second or are downstream from the
first 300 square miles of drainage area;55' and (6) wetlands associated
with (1), (2), (4) and (5).51
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(d).
52. See text accompanying notes 94-96 infra. Recall also that the Act's statement
of purpose specifies priorities for determining uses of shorelines of state-wide signifi-
cance. See note 42 stopra. This categorizing device, whose conception is attributed to
Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General. State of Washington, is
credited with rendering the Act more politically appealing to the legislature. See
Dolliver, Symposium, stupra note 5, at 26-27.
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(e).
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(b).
55. Were it not for this drainage area criterion there could be no "shoreline of
state-wide significance" whicn would not otherwise be a "shoreline." It is conceivable.
however, that a stream could still have a mean annual flow below 20 cubic feet per
second at a point where it drained 300 square miles. The Department regulations
designating streams subject to the act obliquely recognize this possibility. WASH. AD.
CODE § 173-18-040(l)(b) ( 1972).
56. Note the omission here of wetlands associated with category 3 shorelines of
state-wide significance-the water areas of Puget Sound, etc. The result is that the
tidelands and uplands bordering most of Puget Sound (including, for example. Seat-
tle's Elliott Bay) are shorelines but not shorelines of state-wide significance. This
432
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The Act's coverage of certain upland areas follows from its defini-
tion of "wetlands" as:57
those lands extending landward for two hundred feet . . . from the
ordinary high water mark; and all marshes, bogs, swamps, floodways,
river deltas, and flood plains associated with the streams, lakes and
tidal waters which are subject to the provisions of this chapter; the
same to be designated as to location by the department of ecology.
There are thus two tests by which land may qualify for designation as
wetland: It may be land within 200 feet of the high water mark, or it
may be land of a specified type (marsh, bog, etc.) which is "associated
with" a body of water covered by the Act. The first test is easily ap-
plied, although potentially requiring preliminary surveying to establish
the baseline when the line of vegetation (the "ordinary high water
mark") is indistinct.58 The second test, however, requires both deline-
ation of the area in question and a determination of "association."
The Department has provided "designation criteria" to govern deline-
ation of the various specified types of wetland5 9 and has also tackled
the thorny question of "association" on which the statute itself is si-
lent.
The Department's current definition of "associated wetlands"--
"those wetlands which are strongly influenced by and in close prox-
imity to any stream, river, lake, or tidal water, or combination there-
of, subject to [the Act] is not particularly concrete. Moreover, a
different definition was in effect when wetlands were originally desig-
nated by the Department. Associated wetlands were initially defined as
"wetlands which have a surface water connection With any stream
omission appears to have been quite deliberate, but seems to have escaped the Depart-
ment. The Department in its Guidelines includes wetlands associated with these
waters within the definition of shorelines of state-wide significance. WASH. AD. CODE §
173-16-030(13)(c), (f) (1972). The Department, however, has no authority to expand
the statutory definition. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.310.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2Xf).
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(b); WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-040(1) (1973).
59. The designation criteria are codified as WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-040 (1973).
The designations themselves are three volumes of maps (incorporated into the admin-
istrative code by reference, WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-060 (1972)) available from the
Department, the Code Revisor, and the appropriate county auditor or city clerk. If
the map designations conflict with the criteria, the latter control. WASH. AD. CODE §
173-22-055 (1973).
60. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-030(2) (1973).
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. . .subject to [the Act]."61 To this definition was added the crite-
rion (which appeared nowhere in the regulations) that the area should
be "essentially at the same level as the major body of water. ' '6 2 This
definitional package withstood challenge in Juanita Bay Valley Com-
munity Association v. City of Kirkland,6 3 suggesting that the Depart-
ment has considerable discretion in designating wetlands, and that its
designation of (or failure to designate) particular land as wetland will
not be an easy target in litigation.
The new definition appears more clearly than its predecessor to
reflect the broad discretion exercised by the Department in applying
the "association" test. In addition, however, it recognizes that wet-
lands of the types specified in the statute as requiring "association" are
not all necessarily "wet" (e.g., "dry" floodplains are included, as well
as "wet marshes"), and thus that the original surface water connection
61. Formerly WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-030(2) (1972).
62. Testimony of a witness from the Department, quoted in Juanita Bay Valley
Community Ass'n v. City of Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 78-79. 510 P.2d 1140. 1152
(1973).
63. In Juanita Bay, plaintiff property owners association sought to halt develop-
ment of an industrial park on marshland, arguing, inter alia, that the land in question
was covered by the SMA and that the work therefore required a permit which had
not been obtained. The plaintiffs prevailed on their argument that the State Environ-
mental Policy Act had not been complied with (see text accompanying notes 153-62
infra), thus the court's rejection of the SMA theory was dicta. Nevertheless. that
rejection was thorough and explicit.
The land for the proposed development included marshlands, three-fourths of a
mile east of Lake Washington, a shoreline of state-wide significance. These marsh-
lands were connected to the lake by Forbes Creek, which has a mean annual flow of
only four cubic feet per second. Forbes Creek and its marsh thus are clearly not
subject to the Act's permit requirement unless they qualify as associated wetlands.
The Department, applying the "same grade" criterion, had not so designated the area.
Arguing from both the protective policy of the SMA and the legislative directive that
it be liberally construed, the plaintiff Association contended the "same grade" criterion
had no sound ecological basis and had led to an administrative decision which was
"unscientific and contrary to the spirit and letter" of the Act, since the marsh was a
part of the same ecological system as Lake Washington. The court responded that
adopting plaintiff's theory would expand the coverage of the Act well beyond the geo-
graphic limits carefully delineated in the Act. True. the environment is a continuum.
But the court continued:
IE] ven though it may not make perfect ecological sense to draw a line across this
continuum, as the legislature did with its 20 cubic feet per second cut-off point.
that is apparently what the legislature expected the Department of Ecology to do
by delegating to the department the authority to designate "associated wet-
lands".... In this regard, it is notable that there is no indication in the legisla-
tion that the designation . . . should be based solely on ecological factors. On
the contrary, factors such as physical proximity, practical recreational use, and
increased public assets are also involved.
Id. at 81. 510 P. 2d at 1153-54.
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requirement did not always make sense. In any event, since it seems
likely that the current wetland designations were based on the original
definition, 64 judicial approval of that definition has not become irrele-
vant.65
Even when lands inland from the 200 foot line have not been desig-
nated as associated wetlands, it should not be assumed that the SMA
has no effect on their use. In Merkel v. Port of Brownsville,66 defend-
ants had been enjoined from proceeding with development of a small
boat marina, a complex which. was to encompass 122 acres of
"shoreline" (including "wetland") and 10 additional acres of upland,
on the dual grounds that no permit had been issued for shoreline de-
velopment and that defendants had not complied with the State Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (SEPA).67 After several attempts, the defendants
submitted an apparently satisfactory environmental impact statement
as required by SEPA. The trial court then modified its restraining
order to enjoin development only within the 200 feet of "wetlands"
for which an SMA permit had not yet been obtained. 68 Petitioners
immediately appealed this modification, and the restraint on develop-
ment of even the uplands portion of the marina was reinstated. While
the court of appeals could find only two references in the SMA to ad-
jacent uplands,69 both seeming to be mere admonitions to local gov-
ernment to consider upland uses in planning for shoreline develop-
ment, it nevertheless found that the policy of both the SMA and SEPA
would be frustrated by allowing upland development on the project to
proceed prior to compliance with the permit requirements of SMA.
The court relied heavily on the environmentally protective purpose of
64. The designation maps (see note 59 supra) were initially filed July 27, 1972.
Code Revisor's note to WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-060 (1972). The amended definition
of "associated wetlands" was effective July 28, 1973.
65. The regulations make the designations effective for five years. Periodic review
is designed to allow consideration of natural or artificial alterations of the shorelines.
WASH. AD. CODE § 173-22-050 (1973).
66. 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
67. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.010-.900 (Supp. 1972). See discussion accom-
panying notes 153-62 infra.
68. Merkel, 8 Wn. App. at 845-47, 509 P.2d at 392-93.
69. Id. at 849, 509 P.2d at 394. The SMA sections are WASH. REV. CODE §
90,58.100(2)(e), suggesting that master programs include a use element considering
uses of "adjacent land areas," and WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.340, directing local gov-
ernments to "review administrative and management policies, regulations, plans, and
ordinances relative to lands .. . adjacent to the shorelines ... .
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both acts, and noted in particular that to allow development of a
single integrated project to proceed by stages might well have coercive
impact on subsequent decision making:70
There is nothing in the record before us to indicate that the contem-
plated construction has ever been anything but one project. The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether the port may take a single project and
divide it into segments for purposes of SEPA and SMA approval. The
frustrating effect of such piecemeal administrative approvals upon the
vitality of these acts compels us to answer in the negative.
Irreparable damage would flow from allowing any portion of this project
to proceed without full compliance with the permit requirements of the
SMA.
Although the provisions in the SMA relied on by the court seem to
provide at best oblique support for its conclusion, this decision seems
completely consonant with the Act's purpose. A single project requir-
ing development of both shoreline and upland ought not be allowed to
proceed in its upland portion prior to the granting of the SMA permit
without which the shoreline portion cannot legally be begun.
C. Master Programs-The Planning Process
While determining the area covered by the SMA is a prerequisite to
comprehensive planning, the planning itself-the preparation by each
local government of a "master program"' 7' for shorelines within its
jurisdiction-is a subject of far greater statutory intricacy. Here the
initial step contemplated by the statute is the preparation by the De-
partment of formal "guidelines '7 2 to direct local governments in their
development of master programs. The Act requires in sequence:
drafting of proposed guidelines, submission of written comments by
70. Merkel, 8 Wn. App. at 850-51,509 P.2d at 395.
71. Defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3Xb) as "'the comprehensive use
plan for a described area, and the use regulations together with maps, diagrams.
charts or other descriptive material and text, a statement of desired goals and standards
developed in accordance with the policies enunciated in RCW 90.58.020."
72. Defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(a) as "those standards adopted
to implement the policy of this chapter for regulation of use of the shorelines of the
state prior to adoption of master programs. Such standards shall also provide criteria
to local governments and the department in developing master programs."
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local governments, revision of the proposed guidelines, public hear-
ings and adoption of final guidelines.73 Local governments are to de-
velop master programs within 18 months of June 20, 1972,74 the date
the Final Guidelines were adopted.75
Since the master programs, when effective, "shall constitute use
regulations for the various shorelines of the state,"76 and will thus
form the basis for subsequent decisions on permit applications, their
content and method of preparation are of prime importance. In de-
scribing the methods to be employed in preparing the programs, Sec-
tion 10 of the Act speaks in impressive-sounding but indefinite terms
(e.g., "utilize a systematic interdisciplinary approach .. .").77 This
same section then suggests elements which master programs should
include.78 Although these statutory directives seem merely a vague
catalogue of things to think about in connection with the master pro-
gram, the Guidelines adopted by the Department are more concrete.
They require classification of the shorelines into four distinct environ-
ments (natural, conservancy, rural and urban) to "reflect the natural
character of the shoreline areas and the goals for use of characteris-
tically different shorelines. '79 The Guidelines also contain helpful
descriptions of the various geographical characteristics which shore-
lines can present (e.g., marine beaches, dunes, estuaries),80 as well as
specific guidelines for broad categories of shoreline uses (e.g., aqua-
culture, commercial or residential development, breakwaters).81
These features of the Guidelines provide specific points of reference
for designing substance into the master program elements suggested
by Section 10.82
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.060.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.080(2).
75. WASH. AD. CODE §§ 173-16-010 through -070 (1972). The Guidelines were
thus adopted not quite six months prior to the statutory deadline for completion of
inventories.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(1). See also the definition in note 71 supra.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(Xa)-(f).
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(2). The suggested elements are economic de-
velopment, public access, recreational, circulation, use, conservation, historic and
"other."
79. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040(4Xa) (1972).
80. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-050 (1972).
81. WASH. AD. CODE§ 173-16-060(1972).
82. In developing master programs for shorelines of state-wide significance, local
governments must also observe the preferential ordering of uses mandated in Section
2 of the Act. See note 42 supra.
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One of the major perceived differences between the SMA and the
Environmental Council's initiative was the required degree of citizen
participation in the planning process. 83 The initiative, in requiring
preparation of a statewide comprehensive plan by the Department,
called for creation of at least seven regional citizen's councils which
would hold public hearings and consult with the Department. Those
councils, each composed of at least 30 persons, were to include some
public officials, but in each council citizen members not employed by
local government were to form the majority.84 Proponents of the ini-
tiative argued that this requirement assured greater public involve-
ment in the planning process than did the SMA's vague direction to
the Department and local governments to "not only invite but actively
encourage participation by all persons . . . showing an interest in
shoreline management programs .... ..85
The Guidelines, however, overcome this statutory vagueness; they
are elaborate and concrete in their requirements for citizen participa-
tion in preparation of the master programs. After warning that failure
to involve citizens "may be noted as a failure to comply with the
act,"86 the Guidelines suggest a detailed method of assuring such in-
volvement through a citizen's advisory committee for each local gov-
ernmental unit. These committees should, for example, hold at least
three public meetings and one public hearing87 and publish and circu-
late a newsletter. The goal is preparation of a master program which has
obtained "a general concurrence of the public and the advisory com-
mittee." 88 Thus, to the extent that citizen participation can be insured
by regulation, the Guidelines seem seriously designed toward that end;
certainly they do assure an opportunity for such participation. 89
83. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 8, at 8.
84. Id. at 5.
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.130(I).
86. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040(1) (1972).
87. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040(I)(b) (1972). A public hearing is likewise re-
quired by WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.120(1), though the section does not make it clear
who is to conduct that hearing. Note that while the Guidelines do not require the
design outlined as the only method for assuring citizen involvement, a local govern-
ment which deviates from it must explain whatever alternative method it adopts.
and must satisfy the Department as to its efficacy.
88. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040(l)(f) (1972).
89. Citizen support of a technical variety has also been marshalled by the depart-
ment. Several hundred private citizens with expertise in technical or scientific areas
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Another distinction between the initiative and the SMA is the locus
of primary planning responsibility; the initiative placed this responsi-
bility with the state rather than the local governments. This choice by
the initiative's drafters reflected both greater faith in the public acces-
sibility of state government as compared to local government 0 and a
fear of balkanized planning because of the sheer number of local jur-
isdictions involved. Under the SMA scheme, it was feared, each local
governmental entity might plan merrily for its own shorelines without
regard to either contiguous shorelines outside its jurisdiction or to the
overall interest of the state as a whole. The statutory planning direc-
tives and the Guidelines might even encourage this fragmented plan-
ning by prompting each local government to provide for widely di-
verse uses within its particular shoreline area. :91 One visualizes with
some horror the riverside town with its mile of shoreline, divided
neatly into a port, a marina, a residential area, a historic site, a recrea-
tional beach and perhaps a wilderness beach, the whole design to be
repeated by a neighboring town five miles down river.
The SMA's only clear response to this threat is the discretion given
to the director of the Department to designate regions, including two
or more local governments, for which a joint master program is to be
developed. . 2 Furthermore, the Guidelines require master programs to
"recognize plans and programs of the other governmental units, adja-
cent jurisdictions and private developers." 93 Moreover, the regular
procedure for Department approval or adoption of master programs,
as described below, does give the Department some opportunity to
deal with multiple use planning which is unsuited to the character of
particular shorelines. The degree to which balkanization can be
avoided under the local government planning approach adopted by
the SMA will not be clear, however, until the master programs have
been completed and approved.
Master programs, according to Section 9, become effective when
have been formed into an Interdisciplinary Advisory Committee, whose purpose is
to provide assistance to local governments which have limited professional staffs and
inadequate funds to hire outside consultants.
90. See, e.g., Durning, Symposium, supra note 5, at 95-97.
91. The reader will recall the list of elements suggested for each master program.
See note 78 sutpra.
92. WASH. Rev. CODE § 90.58.110(1).
93. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-040 (1972).
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"adopted or approved by the department as appropriate,"9 4 and at
this point in the process the distinction between "shorelines" and
"shorelines of state-wide significance" becomes critical. A master pro-
gram for "shorelines" submitted by the local government to the De-
partment may be approved as submitted; if approval is denied the De-
partment within 90 days is to detail its reasons and suggest modifica-
tions. The local government may then submit a modified program.
The statute does not indicate how often this process may be repeated,
but no master program for shorelines becomes effective prior to de-
partmental approval or approval by the Shorelines Hearing Board as
described below. Grounds for Departmental disapproval are inconsis-
tencies with either the Act's policy stated in Section 2 or the Guide-
lines.:5
Master programs for "shorelines of state-wide significance" may
likewise be either approved by the Department or returned without
approval, again with suggested modifications and an opportunity for
resubmission. Following resubmission, however, if the Department
decides that the program "does not provide the optimum implementa-
tion of the policy of [the Act] to satisfy the state-wide interest," it can
develop and adopt its own master program for the shorelines of
state-wide significance in question.96
. The Act also provides a process of appeal to the newly created
Shorelines Hearings Board97 for situations in which the Department
and a local government find themselves at loggerheads over a sub-
mitted master program. Local governments are given the right to ap-
peal "master programs . . . adopted or approved by the depart-
ment. 98 and the Act categorizes appropriate Board responses accord-
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.090. The terminology convention implicit in the
Act seems to be that the Department "approves" master programs prepared by local
government, and "adopts" master programs of its own. The only deviation from this
convention appears in the final sentence of § 90.58.090(2) which reads "adopt the
resubmitted program" although "approve" would seem the correct meaning.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.090(1).
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.090(2) (emphasis added).
97. Created by WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.170. The Board is sometimes referred
to in the Act as the "shoreline appeals board." It is a six member body. comprised
of three members of the Pollution Control Board, one representative each appointed
by the Association of Washington Cities and the Association of County Commis-
sioners, and the State Land Commissioner or his designee. As someone might have
foreseen, a six member board can cause untold commotion by the simple expedient
of splitting 3-3. This occurred before the statute was much more than a year old.
See text accompanying notes 149-52 infra.
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(4) (emphasis added).
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ig to whether the master program relates to "shorelines" or "shore-
lines of state-wide significance."
With respect to "shorelines" programs, the appeal provisions seem
confused. An appeal by a local government from departmental "adop-
tion" of such a program can seldom be anticipated, since the Depart-
ment has no authority to adopt such programs unless directed to do so
by the Board following a prior appeal (see infra). And certainly local
government will not appeal "approval" of its program by the Depart-
ment. To make sense, therefore, the Act must be read as authorizing
local government appeals from departmental disapproval. Unfortu-
nately, however, it is not clear from Section 9 that disapproval of a
submitted program is the same sort of formal event as approval, and a
formal event is necessary to allow compliance with the requirement
that appeals be taken "within thirty days of the date of adoption or
approval."9 9 The critical date from which the time for appeal runs
should be the date on which the Department communicates to the
local government its reasons for failure to approve and its suggested
modifications.
The Shorelines Hearings Board is to declare the master program for
shorelines valid unless it is deficient in one or more of five specified
particulars, in which case the Department is to be directed to adopt a
new program. 100 Three of these particulars are standard, and require
no discussion: A program is to be declared invalid if it violates statu-
tory or constitutional provisions, is arbitrary and capricious or fails to
conform to required procedures. The two remaining grounds for a
declaration of invalidity require consideration.
The Board shall declare the program invalid if it "is clearly erro-
neous in light of the policy of this chapter." 10 This ground appears nar-
rower than the grounds specified in Section 9(1) for departmental
disapproval ("not consistent with the policy of RCW 90.58.020...
and the applicable guidelines"). 102 This seems to mean that although
consultation between the Department and local governments on the
99. Id.
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(4)(a)(v).
101. WASH REV. CODE § 90.58.180(4)(aXi).
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.090(1). The policy of "this chapter," i.e., the Act,
is presumably the same as "the policy of section 2." The inclusion or exclusion of the
guidelines may matter, however, as, without doubt, does the difference between
"clearly erroneous" and "not consistent with."
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master programs is encouraged through the device of departmental
"disapproval" and suggested modification, where agreement cannot be
reached it is the local government's position, rather than the Depart-
ment's, which is presumptively correct.' 0 3 If this was indeed the legis-
lative intent, the practical effect of the Guidelines on the development
of master programs for shorelines, may be limited 0 4 as may be the
ability of the Department to "insure compliance" with the Act's pol-
icy, as is its responsibility under Section 5.105 Again, evaluation of
these questions must await submission of the master programs.
The board also may disapprove a master program for shorelines
which "was developed without fully considering and evaluating all
proposed master programs submitted to the department by the local
government."' 106 While it is conceivable that local government may
have an inadequate memory or may choose to ignore its prior submis-
sions (particularly as years pass), 1' 7 this provision seems addressed to
programs developed by the Department after the Board has declared a
local government program invalid for one of the other four reasons.
The Act fails to provide for appeals by the Department. In theory a
local government might paralyze the process by never submitting an
acceptable master program to the Department and declining to appeal
the Department's refusal to approve its unacceptable programs. At
some point the Department might choose to treat this standoff as non-
compliance by the local government with section 7(2) of the Act, 08
and adopt its own program.
The waters which surround appeals relating to master programs for
shorelines of state-wide significance are considerably less murky. In
these cases, the appeal will always be taken by local government from
a program adopted by the Department. The Department's master pro-
gram must be approved unless the local government "by clear and
103. If the Department's criterion and the Board's criterion are read as equivalents.
there would be no such presumption in favor of local government. The differing
language, however, makes such an argument tenuous. See note 102 sutpra.
104. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 90.58.030(3)(a) & .060(l)(a).
105. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.050.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(4)(a)(iv).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.190 requires periodic review of master programs
to make such adjustments as become necessary.
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.070(2). The Section directs the department to
undertake development of master programs for those jurisdictions which fail to do so.
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convincing evidence and argument" persuades the board that the pro-
gram is inconsistent with the policy of the Act or the Guidelines. ° :3
D. The Permit Requirement
The Act's basic regulatory device is the prohibition of any "devel-
opment" on the shorelines of the state not "consistent with the policy
of [the Act] and, after adoption or approval, the applicable guide-
lines, regulations or master programs." 110 In addition, "in] o substan-
tial development shall be undertaken . . .without first obtaining a
permit from the [local] government entity having administrative jur-
isdiction under [the Act] ."t The master programs, together with the
Act's Section 2 statement of policy, will provide the criteria for deci-
sions on permit applications. Until completion of the programs, since
the permit requirement became effective immediately for substantial
developments begun subsequent to SMA's enactment, 112 permit deci-
sions must be consistent with the Guidelines, after their adoption, and
"so far as can be ascertained, the master programs being developed
for the area."' " 3
109. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.070 (1963), expressly made applicable by
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(4)(c), the master program also is subject to disapproval
if it "violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency
or was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures."
I10. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(1).
I1l. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(2) (emphasis added). The "government en-
tity" wording may appear unnecessarily awkward since the effective meaning is local
government. Initially, however, the Act provided that the state Department of Nat-
ural Resources would have, over lands under its jurisdiction, the "same powers, du-
ties, and obligations as local government has as to other lands covered by [the Act]."
Ch. 286, § 3(l)(c) [1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. This provision was the subject
of an item veto by the Governor, who stated in his veto message that it "place [dj
more than one agency of state government in a policy making position and in effect
allow [edi a large land owner to both make and approve its own plans."
112. Whether actual construction had commenced prior to the effective date of
the Act is, of course, a question of fact. (But see note 177 infra.) In Eastlake Com-
munity Council v. Roanoke Associates, Inc., 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973), the
court approved a finding that construction had been commenced when defendant had
demolished pre-existing structures and driven 10 steel pile pipes intended to be
permanent. Since the Act has now been effective for over two years, it is unlikely
that many more developers will have occasion to argue that their construction began
in time to exempt them from coverage. Indeed, WASH. AD. CODE § 173-14-050(3)(1973) requires a permit for substantial developments undertaken prior to the effec-
tive date of the Act "[wi here the development is not completed within two years
after . .." that date. The running of the two year period is tolled if litigation inter-
feres with completion of the development. See also note 211 infra.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(2)(a)(iii).
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Because of the practical importance of the permit requirement, the
definition of "substantial development" is critical, as is the definition
of "development" on which it is built. "Development" is defined as:" 14
[A] use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of struc-
tures; dredging; drilling; dumping; filling; removal of any sand,
gravel or minerals; bulkheading; driving of piling; placing of obstruc-
tions; or any project of a permanent or temporary nature which inter-
feres with the normal public use of the surface of the waters overlying
lands subject to this chapter at any state of water level ....
"Substantial development" means: 15
• * * [A] ny development of which the total cost or fair market
value exceeds one thousand dollars, or any development which materi-
ally interferes with the normal public use of the water or shorelines of
the state ....
The catch-all clauses at the ends of the two definitions should be com-
pared to avoid potential traps in applying the terms to shoreline uses
which do not fall into the explicitly enumerated categories. "De-
velopment" includes any project not specifically enumerated which
"interferes with the normal public use of the surface of the waters
... ." To be "substantial," the project, if not worth or costing $1,000,
must "materially interfere," although that interference may be with
either the water or shorelines (which would include wetlands). That a
project might "interfere" and thus be a "development," without inter-
fering "materially" to make it a "substantial development," is not sur-
prising. However, a project which appears to be "substantial" because
it materially interferes with use of wetlands may not even be a "devel-
opment" if there is no interference with the use of the surface of the
waters.
Such a possibility may at first seem farfetched, given the apparent
completeness of the list of specific uses defined as "developments."
Consider, however, commercial timber cutting, a potential shoreline
"use" thought sufficiently important by the Legislature to merit a sep-
arate statutory section governing the extent and method of commercial
timber cutting Thich local government or the Department can allow
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(d).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(e).
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on shorelines of state-wide significance. 116 That Section clearly implies
that this use requires a prior permit, assuming the "substantial devel-
opment" value criterion is met. However, it is not at all certain that
timber cutting is a "development," since it does not easily fit within
any of the enumerated uses in that definition and might well be car-
ried on without in any way interfering with "normal public use of the
surface of the waters." 117 Perhaps this particular dilemma can be
solved by construing the commercial timber cutting provision to
create a separate category of "substantial development," invariably
requiring a permit, thus enabling local governments to enforce the
strictures specifically imposed by the Legislature.
The Act lists certain uses which are not to be considered "substan-
tial developments" and thus do not require a permit; these uses will
usually still be "developments," however, and therefore must still con-
form to the policy of the Act. Even though the exemptions are rather
narrowly drawn, their applicability to any given situation may often
be difficult to determine. Indeed, one prosecutor has suggested, after a
year's experience administering the Act, that "interpreting the applica-
bility of the several exemptions. . . is as difficult as, or more difficult
than, determining whether a permit should be granted for a project
which requires a permit.""18 The exemptions, together with some of
the more obvious problems which may arise in construing them, in-
clude: 119 (1) Normal maintenance or repair of existing structures and
construction of "normal protective bulkheads common to single
family residences" (what, in each case, is normal?); (2) emergency
construction (how much is truly justified by the emergency?); (3) con-
struction of barns, etc. on wetlands; (4) construction of navigational
aids; (5) construction on wetlands of a single family residence for an
owner's or lessee's own use, if its height does not exceed 35 feet above
average grade level (the Department apparently interprets this to in-
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.150. This Section requires selective cutting rather
than clear cutting except where the former is ecologically unsound.
117. The Guidelines, in discussing forest management practices (WASH. AD.
CODE § 173-16-060(3) (1972)) point out that certain timbering practices may have
effects on nearby waters, such as higher water temperature or increased sediment
load. Such effects might constitute interference with use of the water's surface. See
1973 Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. (Letter) No. 73, which discusses SMA permit requirements
for logging operations.
118. Bayley, Symposium, supra note 5, at 71.
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(3)(e).
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clude auxiliary structures such as garages); 121) and (6) private noncom-
mercial pleasure craft docks costing under $2,500 for single family
residences (added by amendment'2 l at the instance of waterfront
homeowners).122 Also exempted' 23 from permit requirements, though
not from compliance with the Act's policy, are holders of certifications
under the Thermal Power Plant Siting Act. 124 Other exemptions were
granted to certain developments in connection with previously platted
land by use of elaborate grandfather provisions;' 2-5 these exemptions
are no longer significant since any qualifying development must by
now be complete.' 2 6
Neither does the permit requirement seem applicable to govern-
mental actions such as platting or rezoning which may be prerequis-
ites to some shoreline developments. Although it might be argued that
this type of governmental action is itself part of the project and thus
an SMA permit must be obtained first, 12 7 mere platting or rezoning
would not seem to fit within the definition of "development"' 28-such
actions themselves involve no physical alteration of the land or inter-
ference with its use. Unlike the Merkel l29 situation, subsequent deci-
sion-making is not prejudiced by any commencement of construction,
and thus there is no justification for stretching the "development"
definition. However, if plat approval is conditioned on certain phys-
ical improvements being made on the land,' 30 and if those improve-
ments constitute "substantial developments," a prior SMA permit
would of course be required.
120. Department of Ecology, Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (undated in-
formational pamphlet published by the Department, along with the Association of
Washington Cities and the Washington State Association of Counties).
121. Ch. 203. § l(3Xe)(vii) [1973] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. (adding a new
subsection, (3)(e)(vii), to WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030).
122. Interdisciplinary Advisory Committee Newsletter. Shoreline Management.
May, 1973.
123. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(8).
124. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 80.50.010-.900 (1963).
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(9)-(10).
126. Among the conditions for exemption is that the development be completed
within two years of the effective date of the Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(9Xe).
127. Cf. the requirement for a prior environmental assessment under the State
Environmental Policy Act, discussed in text accompanying notes 153-62 infra.
128. Cf. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-14-030 (1971). where, for purposes of deter-
mining whether "'substantial development" commenced prior to the effective date of
the Act, a distinction is drawn between "'actual construction" and "preliminary en-
gineering or planning."
129. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
130. See WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.120 (Supp. 1972).
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E. The Permit Procedure
Having determined that a substantial development permit is neces-
sary, or at least prudent, the developer submits an application to the
local government. This must be done well in advance of the develop-
ment's proposed commencement date, since construction cannot be
authorized for 83 days, at the minimum, from the date of applica-
tion.13' The developer must publish notice twiee, in consecutive weeks,
according to a prescribed format. Interested members of the public
are then given 30 days to submit their views to local government.132
At this stage local government, at its option, may require a public
hearing prior to issuance or denial of the permit. 133 Concurrently with
transmittal of the permit decision to the developer, local government
must submit the application and ruling to the Department and the
Attorney General.134 These agencies have 45 days, during which no
construction under an issued permit can begin, in which either may
institute review proceedings.135 If review proceedings (described below)
are initiated, construction will be delayed even longer.
13 1. See Bayley, Symposium, supra note 5, at 70-71, suggesting that this period
causes inconvenience and may be longer than necessary.
132. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(3). WASH. AD. CODE § 173-14-070 (1972).
133. ,WASH. AD. CODE § 173-14-080 (1972).
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(5). The ruling must also be sent to any mem-
ber of the public who so requests or who submitted views on the application. WASH.
AD. CODE § 173-14-070 (1972).
135. If review proceedings are instituted during the 45 days (see text accompany-
ing notes 140-44 infra), construction is delayed until their termination. WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.58.140(4). This Section was recently amended to grant a single exception.
Construction of the third Lake Washington Bridge has been delayed in part because of
permit review proceedings, and the bridge controversy was the subject of legislative
action at the September, 1973, "mini-session." Apparently agreeing with the Depart-
ment of Highways' concern over mounting projected costs while the appeal process
continued (estimated at as much as $30,000,000 per year, Lane, 1-90: State's turn to
bid, Seattle Times, September 23, 1973, at C I, col. 4), the Legislature exempted from
the automatic delay provision "any permit issued to the state of Washington, Depart-
ment of Highways, for the construction and modification of the SR 90 (1-90) bridges
across Lake Washington." S.B. 2657, ch. 19, [1973] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 1350.
The result of this amendment is that construction may commence in spite of in-
progress SMA review proceedings. However, this new exemption is peculiar in that it
seems in no way to address the legality of the bridge under the SMA. This approach
would appear to present numerous difficulties. For example, it would seem that the
Attorney General or the attorney for local government could still, under Section 21
(see text at note 172 infra), seek to have the construction enjoined. And if the bridge
is ultimately found to violate the SMA those attorneys or private citizens might bring
suit under Section 23 (see text at notes 173-74 infra) for the "cost of restoring the
affected area to its condition prior to violation." WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.230. "STOP
1-90" has been a local bumper-sticker slogan in recent years. This amendment may
require its revision, to "ABATE THE THIRD BRIDGE."
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The burden of proving that the proposed development is consistent
with the appropriate criteria rests, at the application stage, with the
applicant.' 36 If the permit requires a variance or conditional use,137 it
shall be granted "only if extraordinary circumstances are shown and
the public interest suffers no substantial detrimental effect,"' 38 and
decisions allowing for such variance or conditional use must be sub-
mitted to the Department for specific approval or disapproval. 39
As noted, the Department and the Attorney General have 45 days
following a local government's permit decision to request Shorelines
Hearing Board review. 140 Similar review may also be obtained by
"any person aggrieved" who so requests within 30 days of receiving
the permit decision, if the Department or Attorney General certifies
that he "has valid reasons to seek review." If the request is not certi-
fied, the requestor may still obtain superior court review "under any
right to review otherwise available ....
"Any person aggrieved" probably includes any person or organiza-
tion who would qualify under developing notions of standing. While a
full examination of the standing question is beyond the scope of this
article, there is little doubt that in order to be "aggrieved" one need
not have suffered economic injury.' 42 Injury in fact is required, but
may include injury to "[a] esthetic and environmental well-being."'143
Thus, an owner of the property subject to the permit would always
qualify, as most likely would an owner of nearby property or a mere
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(6).
137. All master programs must provide for the granting of variances or conditional
uses. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(5).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(5). Discussed in greater detail in the Guide-
lines. WASH. AD. CODE § 173-16-070 (1972).
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(11).
140. WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.58.180(2).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.180(1). The reference in this Section to § 90.58.150
seems clearly erroneous. That Section deals with timber cutting. The intended reference
is to § 90.58.140 which describes the permit process. A similar error, caused by the
deletion of a Section prior to passage which required subsequent renumbering of the
sections, was corrected by the Code Revisor. See Revisor's Note to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.58.020(7).
142. See Durning, Symposium. supra note 5. at 99-100. Bitl compare Graham. id.
at 88.
143. This is the language of the Supreme Court, interpreting the word "aggrieved"
in Section 10 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (quoted with approval in the Court's
latest tilt with the "standing" windmill, United States v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 673 (1973)). Durning suggests.
soundly, that the federal cases may properly be looked to for the SMA standard.
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recreational user of the shoreline area affected by the permit decision.
The Statute gives no criteria for the Department or Attorney General
to use in certifying that the party "has valid reasons to seek review,"
nor have regulations been promulgated suggesting how this determi-
nation is to be made.144
The Board's review of permit decisions145 is to be conducted ac-
cording to the provisions of the State Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) governing review of contested cases. 146 Judicial review of the
Board's decisions is also governed by the APA.147 The SMA provides
that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking review.148 One
foreseeable problem concerning judicial review of board decisions has
already been litigated. In Department of Ecology v. City of Kirk-
land,'49 the Department sought superior court review of a permit issu-
ance on which the Board, in its review, had split 3-3. Respondents ar-
gued that under the APA judicial review was available only of a "final
decision" of the Board,'5 0 and that, according to the SMA, a final deci-
sion "must be agreed to by at least four members ... ."151 The court
of appeals noted that the Board's split was in effect a decision to let
the granting of the permit stand; that this decision could be effectively
reviewed despite the nonexistence of any Board findings, conclusions,
or affirmative order; and that to rule to the contrary would cut off
144. As of November, 1973, the Department had reviewed 1,725 permits. Of
these, the Department or Attorney General appealed 77 (20 concurrently with private
citizens) and 32 more were certified for appeal by private citizens alone. Letter to the
author from Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, Nov. 16, 1973.
The informal position taken by the Department and the Attorney General is to certify
requests for review if the requestor alleges facts which, if proved, would require
either remand of the permit decision to local government or invalidation of an issued
permit. Standing is not considered in the certification process.
145. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.180(3).
146. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.04.010-.940 (1963).
147. In Dept. of Highways. v. Environmental Council, 82 Wn. 2d 280, 510 P.2d
216 (1973), the court faced a statutory ambiguity, (caused by inartful reference to
both the APA and the Pollution Control Hearings Board Act (WASH. REv. CODE 33
43.21B.010..900 (Supp. 1972)) in Section 18(3) of the SMA (ch. 286, § 18(3) [1971]
Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.) concerning whether appeals from the board are to the su-
perior court or the court of appeals. The decision, requiring appeal to the superior
court in the first instance, has been incorporated into the Act by an amendment which
deletes the reference to the Pollution Control Hearings Board Act. Ch. 203, § 2 [1973]
Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess.
148. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.140(6).
149. 8 Wn. App. 576, 508 P.2d 1030, review granted, 82 Wn. 2d 1006, - P.2d
(1973).
150. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(1) (1963).
151. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.170.
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judicial review in a number of cases, perhaps even as a result of delib-
erate vote splitting by a Board majority.' 52 It therefore directed the
superior court to assume jurisdiction.
F. SMA Permits and the State Environmental Policy Act
The State Environmental Policy Act153 (SEPA), like the SMA, "is
an attempt by the people to shape their future environment by deliber-
ation, not default."' 54 A basic purpose of SEPA is to require agencies
of state government, including counties and municipalities,' 55 to con-
sider environmental and ecological factors when taking "major actions
significantly affecting the quality of the environment."'' 5 6 Although a
full discussion of the workings of SEPA is beyond the scope of this
article, some observations should be made to indicate its effects on the
SMA permit process.
In Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Associates, Inc.,157 a
shoreline development was challenged on the ground that in renewing
a building permit the City of Seattle had failed to assess the project's
environmental effects, as required by SEPA. The court agreed,
holding that the permit renewal required prior preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact statement.' 58 The decision demonstrates that the
mere issuance by government of a permit or license for a private pro-
ject may be a "major action" triggering the applicability of SEPA;
SEPA is not directed only at projects undertaken by government it-
self.' ,5 9 Determining whether the exercise of the permit function is a
"major action" that brings SEPA into play turns on whether the
permit decision involves a discretionary, nonduplicative stage of gov-
152. 8 Wn. App. at 579, 508 P.2d at 103 1-32. If a majority of the Board approved
the permit decision of the local government, they could affirm and preclude review by
having only three members vote for affirmance.
153. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.2 IC.010-.900 (Supp. 1972).
154. Stempel. v. Dept. of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 172
(1973).
155. WASH. REV. CODE 43.2 IC.030(2).
156. WASH. REV. CODE 43.2 IC.030(2)(c).
157. 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973). The Eastlake development was also chal-
lenged, unsuccessfully, on SMA grounds. See note 112 supra and notes 199 & 207 infra.
Cf. Merkel, notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra, and Juanita Bay, note 63 supra,
both of which also involved dual SEPA and SMA challenges.
158. 82 Wn. 2d at 487-98, 513 P.2d at 44-50.
159. Id. at 489, 513 P.2d at 45.
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ernmental approval of a project. 160 If so, the decision maker must at a
minimum assess the environmental effects of the project.161 If this as-
sessment leads to the conclusion that the project significantly affects
the quality of the environment an environmental impact statement
must be prepared. 162
The requirements of SEPA thus clearly overlay the SMA permit
process. Issuance of a substantial development permit certainly quali-
fies as a discretionary stage of a project's approval. Most often it will
also be nonduplicative,163 necessitating at least an informal assessment
of the development's environmental effects. This informal assessment
will in many instances lead to a determination that an environmental
impact statement must be prepared prior to the issuance of the SMA
permit. (In most cases, particularly if the permit-issuing local govern-
ment is small, the developer must bear the major burden of preparing
the statement.)
An unresolved question is whether the Shorelines Hearing Board, in
reviewing an SMA permit, has authority to invalidate the permit on
grounds of noncompliance with SEPA. The SMA itself specifies no
criteria for Board review, aside from the requirement applicable at all
stages of the permit process that permits be issued "only when the
development proposed is consistent with. . . the policy of R.C.W. §
90.58.020. '1164 However, given that section's emphasis on environmen-
tally intelligent planning, 65 it would seem peculiar if the Board could
not, for example, require a satisfactory environmental impact state-
ment. In addition, it can be argued that SEPA itself injects this crite-
rion into the SMA review process. SEPA provides that any environ-
mental impact statement "shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review process.' 66 As the Department has argued in
160. Id. at 487-90, 513 P.2d at 45-46. Accord, Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754,
513 P.2d 1023 (1973).
161. Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149.
162. Id.
163. It will be nonduplicative unless there has been some prior discretionary non-
duplicative stage (such as platting or a rezone, see text at notes 127-30 sutpra) since
which time "no new information or developments have intervened .... " "SEPA
does not mandate bureaucratic redundancy .... .. Loveless, 82 Wn. 2d at 764-65,
513 P.2d at 1029.
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.140(2)(b).
165. See text accompanying notes 37-47 supra.
166. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(d).
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support of the Board's authority (or indeed mandate) to consider
SEPA:1 67
The provisions of SEPA are clear that the policies and goals of that
act must be read into other state laws, including the Shoreline Man-
agement Act of 1971. To give efficacy to those provisions . . . the
board may, when reviewing . . . substantial developments, invalidate
permits for such developments if compliance has not been had with
the procedural requirements of SEPA pertaining to the preparation of
detailed impact statements, as well as the substantive provisions of
that law.
G. Noteworthy Miscellaneous Provisions
Several additional provisions of the Act, although relating only ob-
liquely to the planning or permit process, are noteworthy. Section 32
provides special protection for residential views. Structures which rise
more than 35 feet above average grade level and which "obstruct the
view of a substantial number of residences" are to be permitted only
"where a master program does not prohibit the same and then only
when overriding considerations of the public interest will be served."' 168
The Act absolutely prohibits surface drilling for oil or gas in the
waters of Puget Sound or the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and on land
within 1,000 feet of those waters. 169
The Department and local government are given power to acquire
land "to achieve implementation of master programs" by purchase,
lease, or gift.17o Originally this list included eminent domain, but prior
to the submission of the Act to the voters for approval that power was
withdrawn by amendment, perhaps because of fear of the political
consequences. 171
167. Brief of the Department of Ecology as Amicus Curiae at 13-14, in Dept. of
Highways v. Environmental Council. 82 Wn. 2d 280, 510 P.2d 216 (1973) (decided on
other grounds; see note 147 supra).
168. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.320. Query whether a variance or conditional use
permit could ever appropriately override a master program prohibition for purposes of
this Section. This concern for views also carries into the Guidelines. See, e.g., WASH
AD. CODE §§ 173-16-060(4)(c) & (7)(c) (1972).
169. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.160. The Environmental Council's initiative prohib-
ited slant drilling as well as surface drilling; it included the Hood Canal within the
prohibition, but applied only 500 feet landward. Barron, supra note 8, at 6.
170. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.240(1).
171. Ch. 53 [1972] Wash. Laws., Ist Ex. Sess. The "statement for" Alternative
Measure 43B (the SMA) in OFFICIAL VOTORS" PAMPHLET (supira note 8. at 34)
noted that "[t] here is no local or state take-over of private land."
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H. Enforcement
Enforcement of the Act is primarily the responsibility of the At-
torney General and the attorneys for local governments. Section 21
authorizes these officials to bring "injunctive, declaratory, or other
actions"'172 to insure compliance with the Act; Section 23 enables them
to bring suit for damages to public property, "including the cost of
restoring the affected area to its condition prior to the violation [of the
Act or a permit granted under it] .-173 The latter section also provides for
suits by private parties "on their own behalf and on the behalf of all
persons similarly situated." The court may thus award damages for
and require abatement of developments in violation of the Act; it also
has discretion to award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing
party.'7 4
In addition to these civil sanctions, willful violators of the Act or
the master programs adopted under it may be found guilty of a gross
misdemeanor, punishable by fines of from $25 to $1,000 or 90 days
in jail, with the fine escalated to $500 to $10,000 for the third'such
violation within a five-year period.'7 5
As one county prosecutor has suggested, effective enforcement will
require local governments to develop an administrative inspection
capacity, but will depend as well "on private persons to both bring
possible violations to [local government's] attention and to bring suits
enforcing the Act."176
IV. A POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEM-UNCOMPENSATED TAKING 177
Regulation of land use by the SMA may encounter a constitutional
objection raised by property owners. A prospective developer, fol-
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.210.
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.230.
174. Id.
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.220.
176. Bayley, Symposium, supra note 5, at 73.
177. This discussion of "taking" is intended merely to alert the reader to the po-
tential issue. For more complete treatment, consult the sources cited in note 180
infra.
The SMA also presents state constitutional problems of a different type, arising out
of the unusual enactment process (see notes 6-12 and accompanying text supra). The
first of these questions concerns the propriety of adopting an alternative to an initia-
tive to the Legislature during an extraordinary legislative session (as was the case
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lowing denial of a permit application,17  may assert that the Act has
resulted in an uncompensated and therefore unconstitutional taking of
with SMA) rather than during the regular session. WASH. CoNsT. amend. 7. amending
WASH. CONST. art. I1, § (a) provides that:
[An initiative to the Legislature] shall be either enacted or rejected without
change or amendment by the legislature before the end of [the] regular session
Ito which it is certified] . . . . If it is rejected or if no action is taken upon it by
the legislature before the end of such regular session, the secretary of state shall
submit it to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular gen-
eral election. The legislature may reject any measure so proposed by initiative
petition and propose a different one dealing with the same subject, and in such
event both measures shall be submitted . . . to the people ....
While this language nowhere deals explicitly with the timing of legislative action on
an alternative, the following argument might be advanced: Three courses of action
are open to the Legislature with regard to the initiative itself. It may be enacted dur-
ing the regular session; it may be rejected during the regular session or it may be the
subject of no action. Though "no action" is the equivalent of legislative rejection for
purposes of its submission to the people for their approval or rejection, the proposing
of an alternative requires explicit rejection ("no action" not being mentioned in the
last quoted sentence). Further, since the language of that sentence joins rejection of
the initiative with proposal of the alternative, the constitution must contemplate that
those actions will be taken together-during the regular session.
This argument, however, is not particularly persuasive. First, there seems no good
reason to distinguish between no action and explicit rejection. Second, in recent years
extraordinary sessions of the Legislature have become distinctly regular events. Often
they are mere continuations of the 60-day-maximum regular sessions and are con-
vened immediately so that the Legislature can continue with unfinished business.
(Here, for example, the regular session adjourned March 11, 1971, and the extra-
ordinary session convened March 12.) To void a legislative alternative which has
been preferred by the people, on the ground that the Legislature acted in May rather
than March, would appear nonsensical. This seems particularly true since the subject
matter had been under legislative scrutiny even in prior sessions (see note 5 supra).
and since there is no doubt that the alternative was enacted in time to give voters
ample opportunity to thoroughly compare its provisions to those of the initiative.
Another issue is raised by the legislative decision to allow the SMA to become
effective immediately, prior to its approval by the people. This was done on the ad-
vice of the Attorney General (OP. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. No. 5. at 10 (1971)) who con-
cluded that, as long as the SMA would not remain in effect unless approved by the
people, no constitutional provision would be violated. This seems a particularly nice
question in light of the Attorney General's conclusion (in the same opinion) that the
Legislature could not attach an emergency clause to the initiative, in order to make
it immediately effective. Reason would suggest. in support of the Legislature's de-
cision, that barring clear constitutional mandate the Legislature should not be found
powerless to deal with pressing problems merely because an initiative has been sub-
mitted to it. It would be a startling result were a court to require the Legislature
to fiddle for a year and a half while the state burned. In any event, now that the SIA
has been presented to and approved by the voters, and as the effective date slips
deeper into the past, the question may not provide significant ground for controversy.
A final question arises from the Governor's exercise of his veto power over a por-
tion of the alternative (see note 107 sutpra) despite the constitutional provision that
"It] he veto power . . . shall not extend to measures . . . referred to the people."
WASH. CONST. amend. 7, amending WASH. CONST. art 1I, § l(d). To the extent that
the alternative was an ordinary legislative enactment (as it was, presumably, until the
date of the general election) the veto presents no problems. But it is not so clear
whether the alternative ought to have been submitted to the people with or without
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his property.179 Shoreline and wetland regulations in other states have
been challenged on this theory with occasional success. 180 For exam-
ple, in State v. Johnson181 the Maine Supreme Court held the recently
enacted Maine Wetlands Act unconstitutional as applied to deny a
permit to fill a segment of privately owned salt water marsh. Under
the Johnson facts, which one commentator has argued were highly
unfavorable to the state's theory of the case, 182 the permit denial was
found to deprive the owner of the ability to make any reasonable use
of his land and thus to constitute an improper taking by the state.
The basic principle, of course, is deceptively simple: The state may
without doubt regulate land uses under the police power, 183 but at
some point regulation becomes so restrictive that it amounts to confis-
cation requiring compensation. Theories explaining how to distinguish
permissible from confiscatory regulation are numerous. Viewed sim-
plisticly, in modern application the tests often involve balancing be-
the vetoed provision. Even given that problem, had the alternative as presented to the
voters been clear (in either including or excluding the provision) it might be possible
to fall back on some notion that the ultimate legislative power rests with the people,
and whatever they approved should be law. Unfortunately, the SMA as submitted
was ambiguous. The OFFICIAL VOTERS' PAMPHLET (supra note 8, at 93-100), which
gave the text of the Act, included the vetoed provision and the Governor's veto
message, and, to further complicate matters, described Alternative Measure 43B
(the SMA) as the law then in effect, id. at 35.
To duck this problem rather than solve it, it may at least be noted that the SMA
as approved by the people contains a severability clause, WASH. REV. CODE §
90.58.910 and even if the vetoed provision is found to be invalid because the veto
was improper, this should not cripple the act.
These problems are raised briefly by Graham, Symposium, supra note 5, at 88-90.
178. Or while defending a challenge to development without a permit.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." WASH. CONST. amend. 9, amending WASH. CONST.
art. I, § 16: "No private property shill be taken or damaged for public or private use
without just compensation having been first made."
180. See Comment, The Wetlands Statutes: Regulation or Taking? 5 CONN.
L. REV. 64 (1972). The comment reviews various taking theories (relying heavily on
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE LJ. 37 (1964) and Sax, Takings, Pri-
vate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971)) and considers them with
relation to the wetlands statutes of Connecticut, Maine and Massachusetts. See also
the FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 121-153
(1973); Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1582 (1973).
181. 265A.2d711(Me. 1970).
182. Halperin, Conservation, Policy, and the Role of Counsel, 23 ME. L. REV.
119 (1971). See also Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State Policies
Against Marine Pollution-the Maine Example, 23 ME. L. REV. 143 (1971).
183. A reasonably standard formulation is that: "It is .. .well established that
reasonable restraints on the use of property in the interest of the common good and
bearing a real and substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare constitute a valid exercise of the police power." Quoted from an Illinois case
in Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn. 2d 358, 368, 267 P.2d 691, 697 (1954).
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tween the public interest being protected or furthered and the extent
to which the private economic usefulness of the property is diminished
or destroyed.1 84
Since a claim of improper taking is less apt to be successful when
economic value remains in the property even as restricted, particularly
when the regulatory purpose is clearly related to the public welfare,
the problem may not be significant under the SMA. The Statute recog-
nizes the need to protect private property rights. 185 Elsewhere it en-
courages design of master programs to reflect that state-owned shore-
lines "are particularly adapted"' 86 to some uses (e.g., wilderness areas)
which would tend to destroy the economic value of privately-owned
shorelines. Private property therefore may seldom be subjected to re-
strictions which severely diminish economic value. The extent of the
potential problem can not be satisfactorily evaluated, however,
without an evaluation of the master programs (which are still under
development) 87 and the manner in which they are applied in making
permit decisions.
Furthermore, a property right must exist before it can be taken.
The various types of shoreline subject to regulation under the Act are
not all capable of being privately "owned" in the same degree. Prop-
erty rights in uplands which are "wetlands" under the Act arguably
differ from rights in privately owned tidelands, 188 which in turn differ
from riparian owners' rights in the beds of non-navigable waters. 89
184. See Comment. supra note 180, at 72-83. The classic statement is that of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922):
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must
have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When
it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends
upon the particular facts.
185. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.020.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.100(4)
187. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
188. See Corker, supra note 14, at 73-76.
189. See Johnson & Morry, supra note 30, at 51-59. In Bach, 74 Wn. 2d at 580.
445 P.2d at 652, the court noted that to allow the fill would allow a taking of the
rights of the lake's other riparian owners. Zoning by the city of Seattle could not
divest plaintiffs of their riparian rights without compensation. Nor, suggest Johnson
& Morry, is it likely that zoning could totally prohibit defendant from devoting his
submerged land to reasonable riparian uses. See text accompanying notes 195-97.
infra.
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The question will arise whether an alleged taking by regulation is in
fact an invasion of a protected private property right.
Finally, since the Act was amended to withdraw from the Depart-
ment and local governments the power of eminent domain, 190 if a
SMA restriction on use of particular property is found to be unconsti-
tutional the proper remedy will be to invalidate the restriction. Com-
pensation for the taking is not an available alternative.
V. EFFECT ON PRIOR LAW
The SMA's effect on prior law governing use of uplands-land
above the high water mark-should be considered separately from its
effect on the law previously applicable to land or water lying below
that line. Prior law seldom imposed any use restrictions based on up-
land property's proximity to water.191 The SMA, although specifically
prohibiting few if any uses, requires a planning and permit process
which regulates and thus may restrict development on uplands which
are "wetlands." The extent of those restrictions on particular property
will vary according to the master programs which are developed, but
even where no serious restrictions are imposed, many types of devel-
opment are now subject to the procedural requirements of the permit
program. Developments on upland "wetlands" which were begun be-
fore the effective date of the Act cause no particular difficulty-they
are not covered by the Act, and the Act does not affect their legal-
ity.192
Prior law governing land and water below the high water mark was
considerably more complex, as is an assessment of the Act's effect.
Here, pre-SMA law was most concerned with regulating those uses of
submerged land which interfered with uses of the water's surface; dif-
ferent restrictions pertained depending on whether the water in ques-
tion was navigable or non-navigable. 93 This distinction, which was
always slippery at best,'94 is nowhere relied upon in the SMA. Inclu-
sion of bodies of water within the Act's regulatory ambit is based on
190. See text accompanying notes 170-71 supra.
191. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
192. See note 112 and accompanying text supra. But cf. note 211 infra.
193. See text accompanying notes 13-32 supra and Johnson & Morry, supra
note 30, at n.121.
194. See Corker, supra note 14, at 76-78.
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their size rather than their navigability. This attempt to avoid a tick-
lish definitional problem should be applauded, and yet the naviga-
bility issue still lurks in the shadows, and in some instances will have
to be reckoned with.
Bach v. Sarich'95 forbade non-riparian uses of privately owned
non-navigable lake beds when such uses would interfere with the
rights of other riparian owners. Presumably this decision still governs
bodies of water too small to be subject to the Act. 196 But Bach also
applied to numerous non-navigable lakes larger than 20 acres which
are now covered by the Act. One might conclude that all uses of sub-
merged land under such lakes are now permitted, subject only to re-
strictions imposed under the Act. However, Bach seems, on constitu-
tional "taking" grounds, to forbid even legislatively authorized
non-riparian uses which interfere with the vested property rights of
other riparian owners.19 7 Thus, the SMA may impose new restrictions
on non-navigable lakes, but cannot ease old ones.
No such limitation applies to regulation of navigable waters, for
which Washington recognizes no riparian rights. While requiring
removal of a fill on the ground that it interfered with public use of
navigable waters, Lake Chelan 98 invited legislative action; in contrast
to Bach, it suggested that legislation might indeed authorize inter-
fering uses which otherwise would be unlawful. 99 With enactment of
the SMA, the Legislature and the people accepted that invitation and
adopted a process of management which could lead to such authoriza-
tion. Whether anything is left of the use restriction imposed by Lake
Chelan, or whether that case has been pre-empted by the SMA re-
mains to be determined. This question can be illustrated by consi-
dering developments, such as docks for private residences, which are
exempt from the permit requirements of the Act.200 Could a challenge
still be mounted on Lake Chelan grounds-that the development in-
terfered with public rights of navigation--since the government has
not affirmatively authorized the interference by issuing a permit?
195. See note 29 supra.
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.030(2)(d). Nineteen acre Bitter Lake. the subject
of the Bach litigation, is itself an example of lakes not covered by the Act.
197. 74 Wn. 2d at 575, 445 P.2d at 652. See Johnson & Morry, supra note 30. at
58, & note 189 supra.
198. See note 13 supra.
199. See note 28 supra.
200. See Bayley, Symposium, supra note 5, at 74.
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Probably the answer is no. Although the Act requires no permits for
some developments, 20 1 the Legislature has nonetheless regulated those
developments by its decision to exempt them from the permit require-
ment. Furthermore, the Act provides that "[n] o development
[whether requiring a permit or not] shall be undertaken on the shore-
lines of the state except those which are consistent with the policy of
[the Act] and . . . the applicable guidelines, regulations or master
programs. '202 The policy of the Act is not one of complete prohibition
of development, as would have been the result of Lake Chelan, but
one of fostering appropriate uses. 203
Even apart from the effect of the SMA, although perhaps influ-
enced by its enactment, the Washington court in recent cases has evi-
denced a reluctance to extend the prohibition of Lake Chelan to tide-
lands and shorelands which have been sold by the state, particularly
when those lands lie in heavily developed urban areas. In Harris v.
Hylebos Industries, Inc.,20 4 for example, the court, in refusing to
apply Lake Chelan, relied heavily on a long history of legislative en-
couragement of urban tidelands development to deny plaintiff's
claimed easement over tidelands which the defendant owned and de-
sired to fill and improve.
Although this refusal may not of itself be an unhappy result if tide-
land uses can be regulated under the SMA, a frightening aspect of the
opinion was an implication that the Act might not apply. The applica-
bility of the SMA was apparently not asserted by plaintiff, either at
trial or on appeal. However, the Attorney General, in an amicus brief
on behalf of the Department, did argue that defendant's development
required a permit under the SMA. This argument was addressed only
20 1. See text accompanying notes 118-26 supra.
202. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.58.140(1).
203. While the courts have not yet squarely faced this issue, such indications as
are available suggest that they too will reach the conclusion that Lake Chelan type
actions will not be available to challenge developments undertaken subsequent to the
effective date of the Act, whether or not a permit was required and obtained. See,
e.g., the court's language in Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 500, 513 P.2d at 5 1:
The necessity of thoughtful management of our shorelines was recognized by our
[Lake Chelan] decision and the legislature has recently enacted significant in-
struments for such management, the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 and
the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971.'Such enactments should provide
the means for intelligently reconciling disparate interests in shoreline uses.
The Eastlake development, of course, was undertaken prior to the effective date of
the Act.
204. 81 Wn. 2d 770, 505 P.2d 457 (1973).
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in an ambiguous footnote20 5 in which the court observed that "[i] f
the Shoreline Management Act contains provisions showing that the
legislature has changed its policy regarding the proper use of harbor
areas, those provisions have not been brought to our attention." The
Legislature may indeed have changed its policy;2 0 6 more significantly,
however, if the footnote means to suggest that the SMA will not be
applied because the Legislature has not clearly stated that it no longer
wants tideland development in harbor areas the court has missed per-
haps the major point of the Act. In the Act, the Legislature says very
little, directly, about the kinds of development appropriate in any
given location. What it does clearly say, without distinguishing be-
tween developed industrial shorelines and serene wilderness shore-
lines, is that coordinated planning is needed. The Legislature
sees "a clear and urgent demand for a planned, rational, and con-
certed effort . . . to prevent the inherent harm in an uncoordinated
and piecemeal development of the state's shorelines,"2 07 while at the
same time recognizing that provision must be made for many types of
shoreline uses. Certainly the Act nowhere suggests that developments
on harbor tidelands are exempt from the directive that " [p] ermitted
uses . . . shall be designed and conducted in a manner to minimize,
insofar as practical, any resultant damage to the ecology and environ-
ment .... ."208
The Act's basic policy is neither to prescribe nor to proscribe uses,
but to plan and regulate. The permit system is an essential element of
that policy which the Hylebos footnote threatens to scuttle for a signif-
icant portion of the state's shorelines. A master program for the area
in question which impeded harbor development might be appropri-
ately challenged, as might a denial of a permit application, on
grounds that it was inconsistent with legislative encouragement of
such development. But to suggest that no permit is required simply
misstates the intent behind the SMA. If the Hylebos footnote is subse-
quently interpreted in this fashion, an amendment to the Statute is
called for to make its message plain.
Finally, the SMA also changes the rule of Lake Chelan as applied
205. Id. at 786 n. I, 505 P.2d at 466.
206. "[U] nrestricted construction on the privately owned . . . shorelines of the
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to developments placed in navigable waters prior to December 4,
1969 (the date of that decision which presumably put developers on
notice of their peril). For such developments the state consents "to the
impairment of public rights of navigation, and corollary rights incidental
thereto. 2 0: This provision thus precludes new Lake Chelan type
actions against most existing uses, although it does not preclude pri-
vate challenges based on theories other than the public rights of navi-
gation.210 Neither does it affect Lake Chelan actions against uses
begun during the hiatus between the date of the decision and the
effective date of the Act. Very likely, however, there were few such
developments in that year and a half because of the confusion and
caution which the case engendered. 21'
VI. CONCLUSION
Articles discussing various states' coastal or wetlands statutes tend
to conclude according to a discernable pattern: They congratulate the
legislature for taking a bold step, warn of impending difficulties in the
courts and hope for a brighter future for our grandchildren's grand-
children. 212 The reader is invited to decide for himself whether the con-
clusion to an article analyzing the SMA should observe this ritual.
Certainly Washington, in enacting the SMA, has embarked on an
ambitious program of shoreline resource management. Probably the
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.270(1).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.270(2). And see Bayley, Symposium, supra
note 5, at 74.
211. See text accompanying notes 13-28 supra. The regulations suggest that a per-
mit may be required for developments begun prior to the effective date of the Act
"[w] here the activity was unlawful prior to the effective date of the act." WASH. AD.
CODE § 173-14-050(1) (1973). This cryptic provision may have been intended to
allow legislation by permit of developements, improper under Lake Chelan, begun
after December 4. 1969. A development begun prior to the effective date of the Act
may be unlawful for other reasons as well. however, and thus subsequently require
an SMA permit. In Eastlake, supra note 112, construction was commenced prior to
the effective date- of the Act; the development was successfully challenged both on the
ground that the original building permit was improperly issued (pre-SMA) and on
the ground that SEPA had not been complied with at a shibsequent (post-SMA)
stage (see text accompanying notes 157-58 supra). The court noted that "[a]s no
valid [building] permit was in force to justify the preshoreline construction . . . the
[SMA] would now apply if substantial development is renewed. See WAC 173-14-
050." 82Wn. 2d at 498 n.7, 513 P.2d at 48.
212. Mr. John Dunnigan, J.D., 1973, who performed a preliminary literature
search for the author and suffered through an early draft of this article, deserves
credit for this succinct and accurate observation.
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most significant feature of this program is the degree of responsibility
placed on local governments. We must rely on future observers to as-
sess whether local governments have the capacity and desire to exer-
cise that responsibility fully and wisely. However, we must recognize
that for the most part the Act's effects will be invisible-in 10, or 20,
or 100 years shorelines simply will not look as they might have looked
without the planning and regulation which the Act provides. Con-
cerned citizens, whether or not they are trained in the law, should at-
tempt to monitor those invisible effects. As the state's experience
under the SMA grows, those citizens should evaluate the management
choices made by the SMA and work for such changes as may prove
necessary to allow the Act to fulfill its goal of intelligent development
of one of "the most valuable and fragile of [Washington's] natural re-
sources."213
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.020.
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